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1 
COME BACK TO THE BOAT, JUSTICE BREYER! 
Richard D. Friedman∗ 
Introduction 
I want to get Justice Breyer back on the right side of Confrontation 
Clause issues. 
In 1999, in Lilly v. Virginia,1 he wrote a farsighted concurrence, making 
him one of the first members of the Supreme Court to recognize the 
inadequacy of the then-prevailing doctrine of the Confrontation Clause. 
That doctrine, first announced in Ohio v. Roberts,2 was dependent on 
hearsay law and made judicial assessments of reliability determinative. In 
Crawford v. Washington,3 the Court was presented with an alternative 
approach, making the key inquiry whether the statement in question was 
testimonial in nature. During the oral argument, Justice Breyer seemed to 
endorse the test I had articulated, in an amicus brief, for what makes a 
statement testimonial—”[W]ould a reasonable person in the position of 
declarant anticipate that the statement would likely be used for evidentiary 
purposes?”4 Ultimately, he was one of seven members of the Court to 
support Crawford’s dramatic adoption of a testimonial approach. And two 
years later, in Hammon v. Indiana (decided with Davis v. Washington5), 
Justice Breyer was one of eight justices to treat as testimonial a woman’s 
statement accusing her husband of assaulting her, given that it was made to a 
police officer in the family living room a considerable time after the alleged 
event, while another officer held the accused at bay. (I like to think that I 
argued the case for the accused because I believed this was obviously right, 
not the other way around.) 
But consider what Justice Breyer has done more recently. In 2011, he 
helped form a majority in Michigan v. Bryant,6 taking a view far more 
restrictive than that reflected in Hammon of what is testimonial in the 
context of a fresh accusation. And three times over the last five years—in 
 
         *  Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1. 527 U.S. 116 (1999). 
 2. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
 3. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 4. Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (No. 02-9410). 
 5. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
 6. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
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Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,7 Bullcoming v. New Mexico,8 and Williams 
v. Illinois9—he has joined Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy and 
Alito in opinions resisting the proposition that forensic laboratory reports 
are ordinarily testimonial. Each of these opinions gives off a strong sense of 
buyer’s remorse, arising at least in large part from fear of undue burdens on 
the criminal justice system; the opinions seem to be looking around for any 
theory, however strained, that would substantially limit Crawford. Each has 
fallen just one vote short of gaining a majority of the Court, but in 
Williams—thanks to Justice Thomas, who (as in Hammon) takes an 
idiosyncratically formalistic view of what statements are formal enough to be 
deemed testimonial—the four justices became a plurality. Williams has, as 
predicted by Justice Kagan in a sparkling dissent, sown considerable 
confusion in the lower courts. 
What happened?  At least in part, I think the answer is simple: Giles v. 
California.10 At the argument in Giles, Justice Breyer noted that he had 
joined in Crawford, but he then added that he was “rapidly leaving” “the 
boat.”11 And so it has been: since Giles, in every divided case, Justice Breyer 
has been on the side that would limit the confrontation right. 
I. GILES and the Law of Unintended Consequences 
Giles was the Court’s first chance to address in depth the doctrine under 
which an accused might forfeit his or her confrontation right by engaging in 
misconduct that prevents a witness from testifying subject to cross-
examination. I have long believed that a robust forfeiture doctrine is 
essential to the development of a sound confrontation doctrine. And so 
when the Court took the case I was delighted, complacent in the belief that 
the justices would surely hold that by his misconduct Giles had forfeited the 
confrontation right. Boy, was I wrong! 
Giles was charged with murdering his former girlfriend, Brenda Avie. 
The prosecution wished to introduce a statement she had made to the police 
after a violent incident a few weeks earlier. He objected on the ground that 
he had not had a chance to examine her. But the undisputed reason for that 
was that he had killed her. 
I thought that all that was necessary to conclude that Giles had forfeited 
his confrontation right was a determination by the trial judge that Giles had 
killed Avie without justification. True, that was the very question before the 
 
 7. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 8. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011). 
 9. 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012). 
 10. 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 11. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Giles, 554 U.S. 353 (No. 07-6053). 
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jury, but this should not matter. The jury’s job in determining whether the 
accused was guilty of the crime charged was entirely separate from the 
judge’s job in determining whether the accused forfeited his confrontation 
right. Each of those functions may require deciding the same factual issue—
but so what? This, indeed, is just what happens as an everyday matter in a 
prosecution for conspiracy when the judge has to determine whether a 
statement qualifies for the conspirator’s exemption from the rule against 
hearsay.12  And it seems clear where the equities lie: it is an abomination to 
allow the accused to keep the jury from hearing a witness’s statement on the 
grounds that he did not have an opportunity to cross-examine her if the 
reason he did not is that he murdered her. 
But that’s not the way a majority of the Court saw it. The Court said that 
Giles could not be deemed to have forfeited his confrontation right unless 
his misconduct—killing Avie—not only prevented her from testifying but 
also was designed to do so. 
I have thought ever since the Court decided Giles that the outcome was a 
disaster for the Confrontation Clause. This is sadly ironic, because this blow 
came at the hands of Justice Scalia, who wrote Crawford and who is intensely 
proud of it; indeed, he has said it is his favorite among his opinions for the 
Court.13 I hope it does not turn out that, like the doomed man Oscar Wilde 
described in The Ballad of Reading Gaol, he “killed the thing he loved.”  
Some, Wilde said, “do it with a bitter look,” others “with a flattering word,” 
the coward “with a kiss,” and the brave man “with a sword.” Wilde did not 
note that some do it in a more prosaic way, by failing to establish proper 
limitations on doctrine and thus causing that doctrine to be limited in other, 
inappropriate ways. 
Indeed, one of the most predictable consequences of Giles was that, in 
compensation for undue narrowing of forfeiture doctrine, the term 
“testimonial” would be given a constricted reading. And that is just what 
happened in Bryant. 
II. BRYANT: Paying for GILES 
Bryant concerned a statement made to uniformed police officers, with 
no apparent danger in sight, identifying the perpetrator of a shooting 
committed half an hour before and six blocks away. Given just those facts, it 
seems obvious that the statement was testimonial: clearly it was made in the 
anticipation—and indeed, one might say for the sole or at least dominant 
purpose—of bringing the shooter to justice. If Anthony Covington, the 
accuser, were readily available at trial, would it not be obvious that the 
 
 12. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E). 
 13. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 
316 (2007). 
FRIEDMAN, FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/14/2014  4:06 PM 
4 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 113:1 
 
 
prosecution should be required to produce him as a live witness rather than 
relying on the officers’ accounts of what he said? 
But Bryant held that Covington’s accusations were not testimonial, 
which means that, so far as the Confrontation Clause is concerned, there 
would be no need to bring him to the trial or a deposition, no matter how 
readily available he was. How could this possibly be? The answer lies in two 
other facts: First, Covington was not only a witness to the shooting; he was 
also the victim. Second, he was already in dire physical condition when he 
made his accusations, and he died several hours later; taking his deposition 
would not have been humanely feasible, even if Bryant, the accused, could 
have been found in that time. 
If Covington is to be believed, therefore, the reason he could not testify 
live at a trial or deposition concerning the shooting is that Bryant shot him, 
causing his death within an interval too short to allow even for a deposition. 
That is the real impetus for admissibility of his accusations. 
Bryant, in other words, should have been decided as an ordinary 
forfeiture case. If the trial court concluded that Bryant committed serious 
wrongdoing that foreseeably caused Covington to be unavailable to testify 
subject to cross-examination, then Bryant should be deemed to have 
forfeited his confrontation right with respect to Covington. Such a ruling 
would have allowed for an equitable result—ensuring that murder of the 
witness by the accused would not prevent the jury from learning of the 
accusation—without need to deny what should have been obvious: that the 
accusation was testimonial. 
But Giles simply forecloses this result. Even if Bryant murdered 
Covington, the murder was not designed to render Covington unavailable as 
a witness; rather, the altercation appears to have been rooted in a mundane 
dispute over a drug transaction. And so, as a direct consequence of Giles, the 
Supreme Court has adopted a mushy understanding of what it means for a 
statement to be testimonial, an understanding that will likely continue to 
impair Confrontation Clause jurisprudence in contexts far broader than the 
immediate one involved in Bryant itself. 
Because it is often difficult to prove the accused’s intent to render a 
witness unavailable, Giles has also made prosecution of some homicide cases 
more difficult than it should be.  Sometimes, though, where the prosecution 
has failed to satisfy the Giles standard, the harmless-error doctrine has come 
to its rescue. Also, Giles’s effect has been somewhat mitigated by language in 
the majority opinion, and in Justice Souter’s concurrence, indicating that in 
the domestic violence context the necessary intent can be inferred from a 
pattern of abuse. I hope that over time the effect of this qualifying language 
becomes more significant than that of the holding itself. 
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III. WILLIAMS and Extraordinary Coincidences 
I suspect that the overreaching of Giles—which may have given the 
impression of unbridled doctrinal zealotry—may also be responsible in part 
for Justice Breyer’s joining Justice Kennedy’s aggressive dissents in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming and Justice Alito’s equally aggressive opinion 
in Williams. The reports in Melendez-Diaz identified a substance as cocaine, 
and the one in Bullcoming revealed an inflated blood-alcohol level. That 
these reports were testimonial should have been rather obvious: they were 
statements made in clear contemplation of prosecutorial use. The dissents 
seem motivated by fear of the expense caused by requiring in-court or 
deposition testimony by a lab analyst (and, as Bullcoming requires, the 
analyst who made the report, not a surrogate)—a concern that Justice Scalia 
rightly brushed aside in Melendez-Diaz, on the twin bases that it is 
constitutionally irrelevant and factually unfounded. 
Williams was more complex. That was a “cold-hit” DNA case. A private 
lab, Cellmark, analyzed a swab taken from a rape victim and generated a 
male DNA profile. The state police later matched this profile, by searching a 
large database, to that of Williams, who had not previously been a suspect in 
the case. An expert from the state police testified at Williams’s trial to the 
match, but Cellmark’s report was not introduced and nobody from Cellmark 
appeared. 
Five justices concluded, though on different grounds, that the Cellmark 
report was not testimonial. Justice Thomas alone thought it was not 
sufficiently formal to be characterized as testimonial. I believe that his 
emphasis on formality is misguided, because a statement’s lack of proper 
formality does not mean it should be regarded as nontestimonial in nature; 
rather, it means that the statement should not be regarded as acceptable 
testimony at trial. Here I thought Justice Thomas made almost a parody of a 
formality test. The report was signed by two supervisors, it referred to 
“evidence” and a case number, and it was clearly written in anticipation of 
prosecutorial use. But it was not certified, and to Justice Thomas that made 
the difference. 
The other four justices emphasized that the Cellmark report was not 
directed at a “targeted individual.” That assertion is debatable—the report 
was directed at the person who had a given DNA profile, which is a much 
more precise targeting than a name or a facial description. But in any event, 
so what? If only the makers of targeted statements had to confront the 
accused, criminal trials would look very different. For example, at least 
before identification of a suspect, a police officer, or anyone else, could make 
a statement describing the crime scene and never come to court. Similarly, a 
witness who observed an apparent crime but was unable to provide 
identifying information would never have to confront the accused. 
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No more persuasive is the four justices’ assertion that the Cellmark 
report was not used for its truth because it underlay an expert’s opinion that 
there was a match: the report supported that opinion only on the assumption 
that the report was accurate. I do believe, though, that a factor emphasized 
by Justice Alito’s opinion gets closer to the mark: it would have been an 
extraordinary coincidence for Cellmark to come up with this particular 
profile if it were not accurate. That consideration might have supported 
admissibility of the Cellmark report, without anybody testifying from 
Cellmark, but only if the prosecution had not relied—as it did in fact—on 
Cellmark’s proficiency in doing DNA testing. In other words, the essence of 
the reasoning would have been this: “We sent Cellmark the vaginal swab, 
and they sent back numbers that happened to match the profile of an actual 
male, Sandy Williams, who happens to live near the crime scene and against 
whom there happens to be other evidence linking him to the crime.  
Whatever you might think of Cellmark’s proficiency, that would be far too 
unlikely a coincidence unless it so happens that Cellmark came up with 
those numbers by accurately recognizing the profile of Williams’s DNA in 
the swab.” 
Ultimately, though, I suspect that the four justices were motivated 
largely by another concern, highlighted in a separate concurrence by Justice 
Breyer: multiple people usually participate in performing a DNA test, so if 
the report is testimonial, does that mean they will all have to testify? The 
answer is no, as shown by the experience of Michigan, which did not need 
the Supreme Court to tell it that, absent stipulation, the authors of forensic 
lab reports must testify at trial. I supervised a study of Michigan criminal 
sexual-conduct trials and found that, when DNA results were introduced, 
the presentation took an average of 1.24 live witnesses.14  Several factors 
explain why this number is so low. Often stipulations ease the prosecution’s 
burden. Michigan’s police lab integrates vertically to a considerable extent, 
minimizing the number of people involved in performing a DNA test and 
still operating with suitable efficiency.  (And note: lab practice should 
conform to the Constitution, not the other way around.) Perhaps most 
significantly, it is just not so that everyone who participates in a lab test must 
testify at trial. The only ones who must are those who make testimonial 
statements that the prosecution wants to use as proof. And, within limits, it 
is up to the prosecution to decide whose statements it needs. 
 
 14. Richard D. Friedman, Is There a Multi-Witness Problem with Respect to Forensic Lab 
Tests?, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 7, 2010, 10:11 AM), 
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2010/12/is-there-multi-witness-problem-with.html 
[http://perma.cc/VWP4-9L2R]. 
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A Way Forward 
So the state of confrontation doctrine a decade after Crawford is 
disappointing. I believe the Supreme Court can do better over the next 
decade or two. 
A crucial first step would be, one way or another, to render Giles a dead 
letter. That would allow for more equitable results when an accused murders 
a witness. It would also free the Court to implement an optimal standard for 
determining whether a statement is testimonial: whether a reasonable person 
in the position of the speaker would anticipate prosecutorial use for the 
statement. And conscientious application of that standard would encourage 
the Court to adhere to the rule of Melendez-Diaz in the full range of forensic 
laboratory settings (including autopsies); a few years of experience might 
persuade the full Court that the rule is not impractical and so end attempts 
to find ways around it. 
Removing the obstacle created by Giles would also give the Court an 
incentive to develop a doctrine requiring the state, on a type of last-clear-
chance theory, to take reasonable steps to mitigate potential forfeiture. If the 
state claims that an accused intimidated a witness, it might be required to 
take reasonable measures to protect her or to create conditions under which 
she will feel comfortable testifying. Or suppose, as in Bryant, the accused 
fatally strikes the victim, but, before dying, the victim makes a testimonial 
statement. If the victim dies soon afterward, then presumably the accused 
should be held to have forfeited his confrontation right (without any need 
for a separate dying-declaration doctrine). But if the victim remains alive for 
a considerable period, it may be appropriate to require the prosecution, as a 
condition of using testimonial statements by the victim, to offer the accused 
the opportunity to be confronted with the victim at a deposition; this was the 
practice at about the time the Confrontation Clause was adopted.15 
Freeing forfeiture doctrine of the unfortunate stricture created by Giles, 
but shaping it by a sensible mitigation requirement, might therefore lead to 
the development of a body of Confrontation Clause law that is reasonably 
clear and simple, practical, and in keeping with the traditional 
understanding of the confrontation right. I have the pleasant hope that the 
Court will move in this direction, that Justice Breyer will be lured back onto 
the Crawford boat, and that those two developments will each reinforce the 
other. 
I have left aside one conundrum that the Court has not yet addressed 
but will very soon—how to handle statements by very young children. I 
believe that some very young children should be considered beyond the 
bounds of the clause because such children are not capable of being 
witnesses at all; nevertheless, they are still sources of potentially valuable 
 
 15. See, e.g., R v. Forbes, Holt 599, 171 E.R. 354 (1814). 
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evidence, and the accused should have an opportunity to examine them out 
of court through a qualified expert, presumably a psychologist. But that is 
the subject of another essay,16 as it will be the subject of another case.17 
 
 16. Richard D. Friedman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Child Quasi-Witness, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015). 
 17. Ohio v. Clark, 999 N.E.2d 592 (Ohio 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014) 
(mem.). 
